UN Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections and Implications

MICROCON Research Working Paper 17
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Abstract: “Peacekeeping economies” have not been subject to much analysis of either their economic or socio-cultural and political impacts. This paper uses a gendered lens to explore some ramifications and lasting implications of peacekeeping economies, drawing on examples from four post-conflict countries with past or ongoing United Nations peacekeeping missions: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, and Haiti. The paper is particularly concerned with the interplay between the peacekeeping economy and the sex industry. It examines some of the characteristics and impacts of peacekeeping economies, arguing that these are highly gendered – but that the “normalization” of peacekeeping economies allows these effects to be overlooked or obscured. It also contends that these gendered characteristics and impacts have (or are likely have) broad and lasting consequences. Finally, the paper considers the initial impacts of UN efforts to tackle negative impacts of peacekeeping economies, particularly the zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and the effort to “mainstream” gender and promote gender equality in and through peacekeeping. The paper suggests that the existence and potential long-term perpetuation of a highly gendered peacekeeping economy threatens to undermine the gender goals and objectives that are a component of most peace operations.

1 This paper draws upon fieldwork done in Haiti and Liberia in October and November/December 2007, respectively, for a project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on UN approaches to sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations (conducted by Jennings, with assistance from colleagues Ingunn Bjørkhaug (in Liberia) and Henriette Lunde (in Haiti); see Jennings (2008b)); and upon Nikolic-Ristanovic’s extensive work on the Balkans.

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**Introduction**

“Peacekeeping economies” have not been subject to much analysis of either their economic or socio-cultural and political impacts. The relative dearth of analytical or policy attention to peacekeeping economies is to some degree understandable: peacekeeping economies are ill-defined, share many of the characteristics of an economic bubble, and probably overlap to a greater or lesser degree with organized crime and/or the business interests of powerful local actors, limiting the extent to which closer attention is welcomed. Lack of scrutiny may also owe to the perception that peacekeeping economies are incidental to the mandated priorities and activities of a peace operation, and thereby unworthy of dedicated examination; or that they are inevitable and unavoidable, and thus unremarkable. Yet the peacekeeping economy is the context in which most local residents have their main (or only) contact with civilian and military personnel in peace operations. The distortions and excesses of peacekeeping economies, and the services and activities they encompass, help shape local perceptions of the mission (and vice versa), and of the roles, relations, and status of local citizens vis-à-vis international personnel. Inevitably, they also affect relations between women and men.

This paper uses a gendered lens to explore some ramifications and lasting implications of peacekeeping economies, drawing on examples from four post-conflict countries with past or ongoing United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions: Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), Kosovo (UNMIK), Liberia (UNMIL), and Haiti (MINUSTAH). The paper is particularly concerned with the interplay between the peacekeeping economy and the sex industry, including domestic sex work, trafficking for sexual exploitation (hereafter “trafficking”), and sex tourism. It examines some of the characteristics and impacts of peacekeeping economies, arguing that these are highly gendered – but that the “normalization” of peacekeeping economies allows these gendered effects to be overlooked or obscured. It also contends that the gender relations contained in, and gendered effects of, peacekeeping economies – including the accompanying expansion of the sex industry (Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore 2006: 21; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002) – have been (or are likely to be) carried over into the post-peacekeeping period, with broad and lasting consequences. Finally, the paper considers the initial impacts of UN efforts that could contribute to reining in some negative impacts of peacekeeping economies, particularly the zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN personnel; as well as the more diffuse
effort, kick-started by the passage of Resolution 1325 in 2000, to “mainstream” gender and promote gender equality in and through peacekeeping operations (see e.g. Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2004).  

With respect to these efforts, the paper suggests that the existence and potential long-term perpetuation of a highly gendered peacekeeping economy threatens to undermine, if not actively contradict, the goals and objectives related to gender roles and relations that are generally an implicit or explicit component of most contemporary peace operations.

Characteristics, benefits, and problems of peacekeeping economies

Despite the prevalence of peacekeeping economies in post-conflict countries – they generally appear wherever a mission does, if not uniformly in terms of size or complexity – there is relatively little literature dealing with them. A literature review of peacekeeping economies conducted in 2005 found very few examples that invoked the term or specific phenomenon, compared to a much larger literature on the economic dimensions of conflict, the economic effects of aid flows, and post-conflict development (Carnahan, Gilmore and Rahman 2005). There is no generally agreed definition of a peacekeeping economy. Indeed, a 2006 report on the economic impact of peacekeeping missions (Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore 2006) never refers to “peacekeeping economies”, much less tries to define them, focusing instead on analyzing procurement data and financial flows from various peacekeeping missions into the local economies.

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4 The zero-tolerance policy bans UN staff and personnel from exchanging money, employment, goods, services, and other assistance for sex, and from having sex with minors. It also “strongly discourages” any sexual relationships between UN personnel and local men or women over 18. See United Nations (2003). The UN increasingly prefers the term “transactional sex” to describe the activities prohibited by the zero-tolerance policy; see Jennings (2008b). Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security addresses the impact of war on women, and calls for greater inclusion of women (and of a gender perspective) in efforts at conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

5 Use of the term “peacekeeping economy/-ies” should not be read narrowly, e.g. as excluding peacebuilding missions or components of missions. Relatedly, the terms “UN personnel” or “peacekeepers” are generally used to refer to all UN mission staff and personnel, whether civilian, military or police. The use of “peacekeepers” should not, therefore, be read as referring only to military personnel, nor should it be understood to imply that only military personnel are implicated in some of the activities described in the paper (e.g. use of prostitutes, other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse of local residents). Finally, use of the term “local” or “locals” applies generically to the men and women living in the countries hosting peacekeeping operations, without implying a specific group or constituency unless otherwise noted.
Early use of the term “peacekeeping economies” is traceable to the 2002 UNIFEM report *Women, War and Peace* (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002), which attempted to assess the impact of armed conflict on women and make a case for expanding women’s roles in peacebuilding. Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf used the term to refer to the industries and services (e.g. hotels, bars, restaurants, transportation) that spring up when a peacekeeping operation comes into an area, cater primarily to international actors, provide some jobs for locals, and depend on the custom and cash supplied by the operation and associated international presence. In this paper, it is also used to encompass the skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled jobs available to local staff in UN offices or the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that set up shop in the wake of the UN presence (usually secretarial or translation-based, as well as cleaning, cooking, driving, guarding, etc); unskilled and mainly informal work such as housecleaning, laundering, cooking, running errands, etc for international staff; and “voluntary” or “forced” participation in the sex industry, whether independently or mediated through a third party (e.g. pimp, madam) (see also Jennings 2008a; 2008b). Cumulatively, this expanded understanding captures the wider impact of peacekeeping economies, encompassing those employed – whether formally or informally – by the mission or mission personnel, but also including those whose livelihoods depend on the presence of a large cadre of international personnel but are not directly employed or contracted by them. Accordingly, however, it is difficult to assess the size of a peacekeeping economy, much less how much of it depends on or is linked to the sex industry. It is similarly difficult to determine how much of the peacekeeping economy is captured by elites and other groups in society (including organized crime interests), or the extent of capital flight.

Peacekeeping economies are not nationwide in scope and direct impact. They are most evident in urban areas (especially capital cities) where international personnel are most concentrated, as well as those places in rural areas where a military and/or civilian UN presence is located (Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore 2006). They are also not constructed or taken advantage of by the UN exclusively: representatives of NGOs, other international organizations or military forces,

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6 For a trenchant, if arguably overstated, critique of the distinction between “voluntary” and “forced” participation in prostitution, see Doezema (1998).

7 In many countries, the buying and/or selling of sex is illegal, complicating attempts to estimate the size of the sex industry. Moreover, the UN’s zero-tolerance policy may drive at least some UN personnel’s participation in such activity underground.
private military contractors, international and local business interests, and local elites (including local professional staff of peacekeeping missions) are also implicated in them.

While peacekeeping economies prompt the construction or regeneration of a certain degree of infrastructure – including housing stock and an “entertainment infrastructure” (Carter and Clift 2000: 11) comprising restaurants, bars, clubs, brothels, etc – it is debatable how much they contribute to wider and lasting economic development, beyond the immediate stimulus effect. Insofar as peacekeeping economies are discussed, they are often seen as problematic – owing to their inflationary impact on the cost of living and the local housing market, and the distortive effects of the “local hire syndrome (Rubinstein et al 2008: 546)” – but also generally perceived of as temporary. The assumption is that the services, establishments, interests, and impacts of the peacekeeping economy will not outlast the peacekeeping mission, or at least will revert to a more sustainable level. This assumption will be revisited below. Taking it at face value, however, the temporariness of peacekeeping economies is both good and bad. On the plus side, this implies that a peacekeeping economy’s negative aspects, including the expansion of the local sex industry, are also temporary. On the minus side, the expectation that the enterprises, infrastructure, and services established during the peacekeeping economy will eventually downsize or fold entails the loss of many livelihoods, and points to the unsustainability of this particular form of investment or employment provided by the peace operation. That said, many locals in peacekeeping environments tend to have a pragmatic view of the mission, and recognize that they should attempt to optimize the benefits they can receive at any given point, rather than put their faith in an improved situation down the line (Pouliigny 2006; see also Jennings 2007). In other words, the concrete benefits of a livelihood over the duration of the mission – even an unreliable one – outweigh the drawback of its impermanence. Thus, the peacekeeping economy is not de facto problematic or damaging for the individuals involved. Where a peace operation effectively distorts the local economy to create a peacekeeping

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8 Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore (2006) somewhat dispute this negative perception, arguing that the restoration of security provided by missions is the single most important contributor to development in host countries, and further contending that the inflationary impact of peacekeeping missions is overstated. However, they note that the overall economic impact of peacekeeping to local economies also tends to be overstated (with on average less than 10 percent of mission spending going directly into local economies), and concur that the practice of hiring local staff at (relatively) inflated salaries causes significant problems for local capacity-building, which may linger after the mission leaves.
economy, there may be increased opportunities for women’s (and men’s) participation, whether in the formal or informal sectors.

However, this does not mean that peacekeeping economies affect everyone equally, benignly, or beneficially. Notably, many of the activities encompassed by peacekeeping economies – particularly in the unskilled or service sectors – can be considered as comprising specifically “women’s work”. In the case of the sex industry, this is not to imply that men and boys are not also providing sexual services to peacekeepers, but rather that women and girls are generally more implicated in these activities, if not necessarily organizing them. Specifically, as the Bosnia and Kosovo cases indicate, positions of power, ownership, and influence in these economies – especially those aspects controlled by organized crime – tend to be occupied by men, with women’s participation concentrated in the middle or lowest levels.

Peacekeeping economies, and women and men’s participation in them, are thus structured along highly gendered lines. Yet where the peacekeeping economy is considered as something marginal, incidental, or separate from the mandated activities and desired impact of the mission – and/or is “normalized” by mission personnel as an inevitable and, therefore, unremarkable aspect of contemporary peace operation – its gendered division of labor and impact may be obscured or underplayed, and the gendered implications of this are ignored.9 Another way in which the normalization of peacekeeping economies occurs is when mission personnel (wrongly) consider the particular manifestation of, and constitution of gender relations within, peacekeeping economies to be the “natural” expression of the local society and culture (see e.g. Higate and Henry 2004; Jennings 2008b). Gendered relations can be defined as “interactions between and among women and men that are characterized by negotiation, bargaining and exchange between different actors with different access to economic and social power (Higate and Henry 2004: 482)”. This misperception of a particular society’s “normal” or “natural” gender relations is something that recurred in both Haiti and Liberia, where numerous UN informants stated as fact

9 Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore (2006:42) criticize the tendency of mission personnel to make decisions that have substantial, but unexpected or unconsidered, economic impacts, noting that, “[i]n many cases, the missions are ill-equipped to address the economic consequences of policy-making, even when these are acknowledged”. This accidental or intentional blindness to the economic impact of mission activities is arguably consistent with a similar blindness to the nature and visible effects of peacekeeping economies.
an array of racial- and gender-based stereotypes of local residents, particularly women: that they are promiscuous or “easy”; that they “think differently” (i.e. transactionally) about sex; that local women are “naturally” subservient, etc (Jennings 2008b: 61-64; see also Whitworth 2004). Holding such opinions of local residents is likely to make the existence of relatively large sex industries seem unexceptional and organic, rather than something created, organized, and perpetually mobilized and re-supplied – and something in which international actors are collectively, if not individually, complicit.

Means of organizing sexual transactions in peacekeeping economies

While gendered, the peacekeeping economy does not require individual women’s participation in it to be sexual in nature.10 Nevertheless, a significant aspect of peacekeeping economies – as observed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Liberia, and as documented elsewhere (MacKenzie 2007; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002; Martin 2005) – is that they are characterized by, and to a certain (unquantifiable) extent dependent upon, the sexual availability of local residents for international actors11: whether freely, for a contracted fee, or for some form of in-kind payment(s).12 This assertion admittedly encompasses a variety of ways of organizing sexual interaction and contracts between the local resident and the peacekeeper. However, this expansive view reflects the diversity present within sex work itself. Sex work includes a range of transactions, actors, and degrees of vulnerability and control, which obviously contain, but also go beyond, the phenomena of sexual slavery or survival prostitution taking place in brothels or on the streets. It allows for variations in the “employment status” of sex workers – on a spectrum from enslaved to directly or indirectly employed by a pimp or madam, to self-employed – and in the organization of the contract, from a more formal arrangement that specifies the price and service...

10 Although as evidenced by the various (mostly unsubstantiated) tales heard in Haiti and Liberia regarding “relationships” between peacekeepers and their housemaids, even seemingly non-sex-related jobs can entail sexual activity.
11 Afghanistan seems to be the most obvious exception to this generalization.
12 This analysis largely leaves aside the issue of rape and sexual assault – not because these do not occur (although statistical and anecdotal evidence indicate that they occur more rarely than transactional sex in the international-local dynamic), but because they should be seen primarily from the criminal rather than economic perspective, even where there is a transactional element to the initiation of sexual contact. For UN statistics relating to sexual exploitation and abuse (including rape) by UN personnel, see United Nations (2005b, 2006, 2007, 2008). It should be noted that, in Bosnia and Kosovo, trafficking and prostitution are interlaced and many prostitutes are trafficked, meaning that it is not just local residents who are implicated in the sexual side of the peacekeeping economy.
to an informal, diffuse, often time-based contract akin to employment or indenture (O’Connell Davidson 1998: 10).\textsuperscript{13}

Significantly, the UN’s own understanding of sex work – or to use its preferred nomenclature, “transactional sex” – in peacekeeping environments reflects this diversity. This is evident in the UN’s zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse, which defines sexual exploitation quite broadly (United Nations 2003); and in the 2007/8 Campaign to Prevent Transactional Sex/Prostitution, which emphasizes that transactional sex includes, but is not exclusive to, strictly contractual encounters with sex workers. Specifically, the way transactional sex is understood in peacekeeping contexts seemingly allows for longer-term sexual “relationships” to be considered as part of the same phenomenon as one-time contractual sexual encounters (see e.g. Jennings 2008b; United Nations 2003, 2005a).\textsuperscript{14} Interestingly, and perhaps coincidentally, this conceptualization of transactional sex in peacekeeping areas strongly echoes the way in which sex work is often organized in sites of sex tourism: specifically, as an open-ended exchange “based on only a very general, implicit understanding that some form of payment (O’Connell Davidson 1998: 78)”, monetary or otherwise, will be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, O’Connell Davidson (1998: 77-79) argues that many skilled and experienced sex workers in sex tourism sites benefit more from these kinds of open-ended, unarticulated exchanges than they would in more straightforward, commoditized transactions.

Regardless, the point is that, like in sex tourism sites, the sexual transactions occurring in peacekeeping economies include but are not limited to the stereotypical sex worker-client exchange; nor are they necessarily transacted in establishments dedicated to such exchanges, e.g. brothels, massage parlors, strip clubs. Obviously survival prostitution, trafficking, and sexual slavery can be found in peacekeeping economies (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002; see also Save

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[13]{O’Connell Davidson (1998) uses the terms “prostitution” and “prostitutes” instead of “sex work” and “sex workers”.}
\footnotetext[14]{As noted in footnote 3 above, the zero-tolerance policy is ambiguous on the issue of sexual relationships between peacekeepers and locals. It does not prohibit them outright but does strongly discourage them, on the presumption that they are exploitative. However, there is seemingly scope for the zero-tolerance policy’s prohibition on transactional sex to be applied to transactional relationships, although it is unclear what constitutes the dividing line between a “real” and a transactional relationship. See Jennings (2008b).}
\footnotetext[15]{A simple working definition of sex tourism is “travel for which the main motivation is to engage in commercial sexual relations (Carter and Clift 2000: 6, emphasis added)”.
\end{footnotesize}
Yet just as “there is no single paradigm of sex tourism, but many (Ryan 2000: 24)”, so there is no single paradigm for transactional sex in peacekeeping economies. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the dominant paradigm was a surge in domestic sex work and trafficking, and the politico-economic, social, and gendered effects of this have been both lasting and widespread, being felt far beyond those directly implicated in the sex industry. The next section explores some of these effects.

**The sex industry, gender relations, and (post-) peacekeeping economies in Bosnia and Kosovo**

In Bosnia and Kosovo, domestic sex work and sex trafficking have become a seemingly permanent part of the post-war and post-peacekeeping economy. Although several factors have played a role in creating this situation, research from Bosnia in particular suggests that one of the most important contributing factors is the prostitution infrastructure that was developed during the peacekeeping period, in connection with the demand created by the large international presence and continued post-war militarization (Hajdinjak 2002; Pallen 2003; Pugh 2004; Long 2005). The peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo significantly affected the sex industry on both the supply and demand sides, effectively creating avenues for – or at least, greatly expanding – the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation into/through these areas. Increased demand was created by both local and international customers, with the latter providing particularly lucrative trade (Kroeger 2002). Since this newly created demand was impossible to meet using only local women, trafficking of foreign women from among the poorest (post-communist) countries provided additional supply. The peacekeeping economy thus affected the entire region, making Bosnia and, later, Kosovo, predominantly destination sites for trafficked women – as opposed to the neighboring countries, which are mostly supply or transit sites.

The Bosnia and Kosovo cases are thus consistent with other places in which the development and evolution of sex trafficking is a component of the overall expansion of the sex industry, which in turn is driven by militarism – with long-term consequences on both the local and

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16 UNMIBH was active from 1995 to 2002; UNMIK began in 1999 and is still active, although experiencing a rapid drawdown in 2008 (CIC 2009).
17 Cambodia is another example of a peacekeeping economy, an expanded sex industry, and trafficking, with lasting effects (including in HIV rates); see Whitworth (2004).
global levels.\textsuperscript{18} Once created, demand prompts the supply of women. When demand is reduced, as usually happens when the foreign military presence diminishes or disappears, supply continues to exist and, as seen in Bosnia in particular, can easily be shifted in another direction. Both the Bosnian and Kosovo cases are also particularly good examples of the confluence between organized crime, the sex industry, international actors, and the entertainment infrastructure in peacekeeping and post-peacekeeping environments.

The prevalence of rape and sexual slavery in Bosnia during the war is well known; and during this period, there are also documented cases of UN soldiers that, far from helping the victims (mainly Muslim women held and controlled by Serbs), were clients and users of their “services” (Gutman 1994). Testimonies also emerged from some prison survivors alleging that they used to see girls being forced into UN vehicles and driven off to an unknown destination (\textit{Ibid.}: 207). In the years immediately following the war (1996 to 2003), the wartime phenomenon of rape camps filled with local women was replaced by brothels filled with foreigners from Eastern Europe (DeBusschere 2007), in order to fulfill the demand of thousands of international peacekeepers; the private military companies that accompanied them; the international police forces; the army of professional and administrative workers connected to various international organizations, including those governing and administering Bosnia according to its status as an international protectorate; and the newly emerging local elites. A similar phenomenon was later seen in Kosovo.

Importantly, international military and civilian personnel were implicated in the sex industry in Bosnia and Kosovo from an early stage – not just as users of prostitution, but also as active participants in the trafficking networks being run in and through Bosnia. According to local NGOs at the time (Limanowska 2002: 65), 50 percent of clients in Bosnian brothels were internationals. While this number has been disputed, it is nevertheless estimated that at least 70 percent of all profits from prostitution in Bosnia came from internationals, who paid different rates and spent more money in bars than Bosnian men (Limanowska, 2002:65). Furthermore, a report from 2002 documented significant local police, international police, and some Stabilization Force (SFOR) complicity in trafficking in women in Bosnia (Human Rights Watch

\textsuperscript{18} On the link between militarism and sex industries, see e.g. Enloe (1983, 1989); Truong (1990); Carter and Clift (2000); Leheny (1995); Whitworth (2004); Euler and Welzer-Lang (2000).
2002). This scenario was later repeated in Kosovo, where, according to the report from the 2002 Turin Conference on Trafficking, Slavery and Peacekeeping: “The combination of the end of hostilities and the arrival of relatively rich peacekeeping operation personnel drove the hasty establishment of brothels and, in turn, founded the links between UNMIK personnel and trafficking syndicates. Within this observation lies the most significant challenge, then, to the peacekeeping operations in regards to trafficking - the fact that peacekeepers are often part of the problem (cited in Picarelli 2002:13”).

This quotation suggests that the peacekeeping economy in Kosovo was closely connected to organized crime; the same observation applies to Bosnia. According to Lalic, organized crime is a significant source of income and employment in Bosnia, with human trafficking for sexual exploitation comprising an important revenue source (Lalic 2007:91). Moreover, organized crime involvement in the domestic sex industries and sex trafficking into/through Bosnia and Kosovo is now considered extremely difficult to displace. This is primarily because the creation of an illegal labour market related to sex work and sex trafficking (and fuelled largely by international demand) led to a sizable contingent of people – predominantly men, but also some women – who became used to earning money through jobs created by organized crime: for example, by becoming involved in the sex industry as pimps, owners or employees in brothels and night clubs, etc; and in trafficking as recruiters, brokers, or traffickers (Feher 1995:76). As Skjelsbæk (2004: 29) notes, “capitalizing on women’s sexuality has spread to many levels of society in Bosnia”. Thus, even after the peacekeeping troops are downsized and withdrawn, the illicit organized crime economy – which is largely accepted as a complement to or substitute for the inefficient formal economy – continues to operate, if in a slightly modified form.

This is evidenced by recent data on sex trafficking in Bosnia, which show that women continue to be both imported and exported, with the number of foreign women decreasing and the number of victims from Bosnia increasing drastically (Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006). These numbers show that the demand that fuels sex work and sex trafficking has not abated; and, on the supply side, reflects the economic desperation that many Bosnian (and other) women continue to find themselves in, which prompts them to turn to illegal channels for work and increases their vulnerability to trafficking.
Indeed, in addition to organized crime interests looking to perpetuate their business, the economic and socio-cultural condition of women in post-war and (post-) peacekeeping Bosnia and Kosovo is another important reason why the trade in sex work and sex trafficking has been difficult to dislodge. In the peacebuilding process, little has been done to create opportunities for women. In Bosnia, for example, women remain a marginalized group, but at the same time, are the heads of thousands of households due to the death or disappearances of their spouses. The Bosnian state also turns a blind eye to the sex industry, therefore contributing to its mainstreaming. Moreover, as a result of not only economic changes at both individual and societal levels (the latter related to the post-communist shift from a command to a market economy), but also changes in normative heterosexuality, both women and men are also pushed/attracted to take jobs within the sex industry and/or to involve themselves in sex trafficking (as offenders within organized crime elements). Accordingly, both women and men can secure economic survival as well as social standing for reaffirming their adherence to regressive gender identities (Messerschmidt 1993: 122).

Here the recent retraditionalization of cultural images about sexuality and gender identities, roles, and relations is particularly important, in ways specifically connected to, but extending beyond, the sex industry. While this shift in gender identities, roles, and relations cannot be attributed solely to the peacekeeping economy, the interrelation between the peacekeeping economy and the sex industry, and the explosive growth of the latter, are crucial to the context in which the changes have occurred. This retraditionalization is more broadly connected to social and economic changes in post-communist countries, globalization and militarization (Nikolic-Ristanovic 2002: 60). Changes in popular perceptions of sexuality and gender are best mirrored in the dual explosion of beauty/fashion magazines and pornography. As Daskalova (2001: 249) notes, "the message conveyed is that beauty is the most valuable female 'asset' and that every woman should try to make herself sexually attractive to men and to become a source of men's pleasure". Through popular media, the traditional opposition between men's sexual "needs" and women’s “status” as passive sexual objects and men's property has been reconstructed. Such perceptions are used in part to justify gender-based violence and blame the victim. They may also affect women’s participation in (or vulnerability to) the sex industry. As a push factor, new images of sexuality influence women's vulnerability to sex trafficking by widening the gap.
between cultural expectations and the possibilities for achieving them (e.g. beautiful woman/sex object as an ideal, on the one hand, and expensive beauty products, clothes, etc., on the other). At the same time, as a pull factor they operate through feeding the myth that working in the sex industry is an attractive job – the “Pretty Woman syndrome” (Oleszczuk and Buchowska 1996: 27).

Masculinity is also affected by this retraditionalisation, and also in ways that can be linked to the perpetuation of the sex industry. There is an evident resurgence of “traditional” masculinity among those men who have become rich or otherwise successful in the new (post-communist, post-conflict) society. These men tend to reflect or strive for a cultural image of the man as breadwinner, but also as combatant: a potent, tough, and militarized maleness. The “traditional” role of breadwinner (for some men, at least) has been enabled by the re-establishment of private ownership (Blagojevic 1997: 80). Among these men one finds successful private businessmen, men in managerial positions, members of the new state elite, and military men. One also finds criminals, especially those implicated in war crimes and organized crime. These men tend to fit the new cultural ideal of hegemonic masculinity in different ways: from how they look, act, and consume – with particular markers and macho symbols being a projected toughness, as well as weapons, luxury cars, mobile phones, etc – to the way they act in relation to women. The breadwinner needs a housewife; the “omnipotent man” is complemented by a “helpless doll”. Yet as evident above, the men able to embody this traditional masculinity – i.e. to be “real” men – are relatively few, and occupy a narrow and particular space: in the public imagination, at least, they are the mafia men, criminals, foreigners, or the new political elite. Thus, according to a respondent for a survey on social change, gender and violence in post-conflict and post-communist societies: "[P]рактически there are [no] real men. If we see one, he either earned money illegally and now pretends to be 'real' or he came from abroad. Otherwise, there is no chance here for a man to be 'real'"(Nikolic-Ristanovic 2002).

The flip side of this is that the complementary notion of femininity – in which women occupy a more “traditional” (dependent, subservient) role in the gendered division of labor – is available to only a small number of women. The economic situation of most women in Bosnia (and Kosovo) forces them to share the burden of breadwinning with their partners, or themselves be the sole breadwinners. There is thus a connection with the hegemonic masculinity described
above: women who achieve emphasized femininity, with its focus on the centrality of the home and motherhood, are mainly those whose partners belong to the small segment of rich “real” men. In terms of sexuality, however, the phenomenon of “traditional” femininity is much more widespread, especially among young women influenced by and striving for the cultural image of woman as a doll and a sexual object. Ironically, men's and women's attempts to achieve the “traditional” cultural model of sexuality are most obvious in the rise of the sex industry. The place that men hold within the economic structure usually determines the role they have within the sex industry (e.g. as street pimps, brothel owners, traffickers or clients). However, although there are different subordinated masculinities, they are always dominant in relation to women. In other words, whatever their economic position, women who identify themselves as sex objects are always subordinated to men. Among women, differences are found in the different relations between various manifestations of emphasized femininities (e.g. street prostitutes, call girls, madams, brothel owners, etc.).

Cultural images of women as sex objects have thus become a strong contributing factor for neutralizing, and even glorifying, the seamy side of trafficking and prostitution. But these new gender images in post-communist countries’ media are part of much broader cultural tendencies associated with rapid liberalization of trade and economic activity across the world, especially with market liberalism, as the "reorganization of economic and political life around the sovereignty of the citizen as a consumer"(Taylor and Jamieson 1999: 264). These cultural tendencies include colonization or commodification of sexuality, which is now playing an increasing role in the public culture of marketized societies throughout the world. In transitional societies, moreover, they are also given meaning in the newly obtained freedom of speech and democracy, represented in the uncontrolled presence of pornography (Nikolic-Ristanovic 2002). However, while reinforcing traditional patriarchal expectations, a market economy and militarism actually contribute to a decrease rather than an increase in the chances for large numbers of men and women to achieve ideal masculinity and femininity, except through participation in illegal or illicit activities – an option which, thanks in large part to the peacekeeping economy, is more widely available.
Finally, while the changes in gender identities, roles, and relations experienced in Bosnia and Kosovo are by no means uniformly replicated in other post-war, (post-) peacekeeping countries, these environments are typically sites of great flux (including regressive change) in gender roles and relations. Indeed, a post-conflict “backlash” against women – including through attempts to “restore” them to traditional roles and norms – is well documented (see e.g. Pankhurst 2008; Turshen 2001). The highly gendered peacekeeping economy may therefore buttress this backlash, especially where the peacekeeping-related growth of the sex industry reinforces the idea of women as sex objects and men as “warriors” and “owners” of women (and children) (Jennings 2009).

Thus, once the sex industry had been installed by organized crime interests, peacekeepers and local colluders, the foundation was there to continue the business. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, demand seems still to be high in the (post-) peacekeeping period: a consequence of both the increased habit of local men (especially nouveaux-riches) to use sexual services, and the presence of internationals other than peacekeeping troops. This is a reminder that the downsizing or closure of a peacekeeping mission does not imply the removal of all internationals. Instead, a diminished but still sizable population of foreigners (and their relatively inflated salaries) remains in the area.\(^{19}\) The entertainment infrastructure thus remains embedded for both local and continued international use; and, because the economic situation in Bosnia, Kosovo, and neighboring countries continues to be difficult for women in particular, the demand for sex trafficking created during peacekeeping economies is easily fulfilled, while the trade itself may be perpetuated domestically and/or shifted in different directions (Nikolić-Ristanovic 2003).

The Bosnia and Kosovo cases therefore demonstrate the fallacy of assuming that peacekeeping economies’ impacts are temporary, or confined to economic flows, booms and busts. Rather, the effects are lasting, diverse, and dispersed. The Bosnia and Kosovo cases show the tight interconnections between the peacekeeping economy and the sex industry – it is virtually impossible to separate the two – while the explosion of the sex industry (and the organized crime elements implicated in it) has contributed and been intrinsic to ongoing and regressive changes in

\(^{19}\) In Kosovo, this includes the US military forces stationed at Camp Bondsteel, which is the largest military base in Europe (Euler 2000:75), and seemingly permanent.
gender, identities, roles, and relations. The political, cultural, and socio-economic effects of these changes are not confined to those directly implicated in the sex industry, but are felt by men and women throughout society.

Learning the lesson? Peacekeeping economies and the new gender awareness

The Bosnia and Kosovo missions predate, at least in their inception, a more recent emphasis on gender by the UN. This is epitomized by the passages in October 2000 of Resolution 1325 and in June 2008 of Resolution 1820 on Women, Peace and Security, as well as other recent moves to reduce some negative impacts of peacekeeping economies – namely through the aforementioned zero-tolerance policy – and to mainstream gender and promote gender equality in and through UN peacekeeping operations. These concerted efforts at both the institutional and symbolic levels might generate the expectation that the negative effects seen in Bosnia and Kosovo are less likely to be replicated. This prompts the question: is the link between peacekeeping economies and sex industries still valid in light of more dedicated efforts within the UN system and by (some) member states on gender awareness and equality?

On the basis of anecdotal evidence and observation in Haiti and Liberia, this link remains durable. Both Port-au-Prince and Monrovia have developed robust entertainment infrastructures catering to peacekeepers and other international actors and local elites. In Haiti, there is also evidence of women from the Dominican Republic being trafficked to the capital’s brothels and clubs, including these catering to international clientele – an interesting phenomenon, in light of the Dominican Republic’s own relatively large and well-established sex industry, of which sex tourism is a substantial component (see e.g. Brennan 2004). Meanwhile, Port-au-Prince has a highly visible street prostitution market, including in Petionville, a district favored by

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20 Resolution 1820 on Women, Peace and Security was adopted in June 2008. It recognizes sexual violence as a security issue that justifies a security response, thus ensuring that sexual violence in conflict zones falls under the remit of the Security Council and will not automatically be marginalized as a “women’s issue” to be dealt with at other, lower levels. It also establishes UN procedures to monitor sexual violence in armed conflict; calls on the Secretary-General to formulate guidelines to improve peacekeepers’ ability to protect women and children from sexual violence; and demands that parties to armed conflict adopt prevention and protection measures to end sexual violence. The Secretary-General is also called upon to report to the Security Council on 1820’s implementation.

21 Interview with a UN informant in Port-au-Prince, October 2007; and personal observation of Dominican women working in a Haitian club/brothel (although observation alone does not enable judgment on the issue of whether trafficking has occurred or happens on a wide scale).
internationals; while the higher end of the market is seemingly concentrated in clubs, brothels, or restaurants, where there seems to be greater or lesser degrees of control and coercion operating between the establishment owners and the women. In Liberia, trafficking has also occurred, including cases that seem explicitly linked to demand generated by the peacekeeping economy (UNMIL 2007, cited in Jennings 2008b). Moreover, while the street prostitution market is less visible in Monrovia than Port-au-Prince – at least in areas frequented by internationals – the market itself otherwise seems to share similar characteristics.

In particular, regarding the means of organizing sexual transactions, in Liberia, one local informant – drawing on a study commissioned by the Liberian National AIDS Control Program – divided local women and girls transacting sex into three loose categories: prostitutes, hustlers, and homegirls (see also Jennings 2009). These groups can co-exist in the same sphere, such as in or around nightclubs in Monrovia. In general terms, prostitutes are professional sex workers making relatively good livings; they are almost always organized by a pimp or madam, and tend to be stigmatized. Hustlers are akin to survival prostitutes: they sell sex as needed, often to obtain the basics of life, and do not typically self-identify as prostitutes; they are probably not organized, generally work on the streets, and may be objects of pity to those around them. Homegirls are the most ambiguous group, seeming to occupy an approximate middle point on the spectrum between hustlers and prostitutes. They tend to live in their family home and are not engaged in prostitution in any organized or survival context, nor do they self-identify as prostitutes; and they are typically not dependent on sexual transactions for survival, but use transactional sex or transactional relationships with “boyfriends” to maintain or improve their standard of living. Homegirls’ main goal is to develop a relationship with an international, perhaps ideally a “love” relationship but, at the least, a mutually beneficial one. These archetypes also seem to exist, if in a slightly different form, in Haiti.

Finally, local informants in both Haiti and Liberia describe the existence and/or perpetuation of gender relations and roles predicated on male dominance and female subordination, in matters relating to – but also extending beyond – sexual relations with either local or international men (Jennings 2008b). In Liberia, despite some notable advances for women – most obviously the 2005 election of Ellen Johnson Sirleff as president, backed by the unprecedented registration and
turnout of women voters – there is an ongoing problem of women being pressured, coerced, or forced into sex in order to attain some form of advantage, such as a job, good grades, a ride into town, etc. This “sex for help” culture seems mirrored in the way that some Liberian women approach sexual relationships or encounters with international men, as evidenced most obviously by the homegirls example. This, in turn, may reinforce the impression among some UN personnel that the peacekeeping economy in Liberia, and the gendered relations it entails, is a normal expression of the “natural” way the society functions. In Haiti, meanwhile, both local and UN informants described the situation of the Haitian woman as being one of insecurity, poverty, lack of rights, and lack of legal, physical, and social protection. Moreover, some local informants saw the prospect of UN personnel sexually abusing or exploiting Haitian women and girls as being no more or less than what could be expected; in other words, that a group of UN personnel (specifically, men) cannot be expected to treat Haitian women better than a group of Haitian men would, notwithstanding the existence of the zero-tolerance policy or their status of UN peacekeepers (Jennings 2008b: 58-59). In other words, there was no expectation of positive change to gender roles and relations – at least in the arena of sexual behavior – evolving from the presence of MINUSTAH. To the contrary, the charge has been leveled at MINUSTAH that they are “tourists”, only interested in Haiti for the beaches and the women.

The existence of peacekeeping economies with (seemingly robust) sex industries does not, of course, pre-ordain Haiti or Liberia to the path previously trodden by Bosnia and Kosovo. However, several factors seem to favor the post-peacekeeping perpetuation of their respective sex industries, if in modified form – including possibly in the direction of sex tourism. These factors include the existence of an entertainment infrastructure; the many beaches and a tropical climate; the continued economic desperation of the populace, especially women; a pro-tourism

22 The homegirls example in particular also arguably echoes the “sugar daddy”-type relationship structure that still exists in Liberia, and that is itself a manifestation of the “sex for help” phenomenon. Interviews and informal discussions with two local informants, Monrovia, November-December 2007; see also Anarfi (1998) on the range of sexual relationships evident in some African contexts.

23 Interviews with Haitian and UN informants, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, October 2007.

24 However, at least one Haitian informant thought that, if a woman were to be raped by someone from MINUSTAH, then MINUSTAH would bear the stigma; while a woman raped by a Haitian man is more likely to be stigmatized herself. Interview with Haitian informant, Cap Haitien, October 2007.


26 For an expanded version of this argument, see Jennings (2009).
policy on the part of state actors, as an element of their national development strategies and owing to their need for foreign exchange; and permissive state policies towards the sex industry – what Clancy (2002: 80) calls “the state as pimp”. All of these factors also tend to feature strongly in sites of sex tourism, including those that developed in the wake of a foreign military presence or occupation. Moreover, both Haiti and Liberia may also be well-placed to attract a particular niche of sex tourists, namely “hardcore” sex tourists, who tend to fetishize an imagined “state of nature” in which “natural laws” pertaining to gender and racial relations and hierarchies remain in operation (O’Connell Davidson 2001: 14). In this respect, the (perceived) characteristics of post-peacekeeping countries that might scare off regular tourists – widespread poverty, a legacy of “savage” conflict, poor law enforcement and patchy state authority, and extreme and visible inequality – are exactly those that would play into the “state of nature” construct to which hardcore sex tourists are attracted. That said, even if Haiti and Liberia do not themselves become popular sites for sex tourism, the existence of neighboring countries with well developed sex tourism industries (the Dominican Republic and Ghana, respectively) implies that there will be an ongoing demand for the supply generated in large part by the peacekeeping economies.

The zero-tolerance policy, its effectiveness, and the constraints of UN action

The impact of the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on the sex industries in Liberia and Haiti is debatable. The policy itself is difficult to enforce and undermined by underreporting; and while it seems to have curbed some of the worst excesses of sexual exploitation and abuse that were previously experienced (especially in Liberia), it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which these have simply been driven underground. Certainly it has not sounded the death knell for the entertainment infrastructure in either Monrovia or Port-au-Prince – which, to be fair, is not the policy’s intention, nor can it be a reasonable expectation. After all, the zero-tolerance policy says nothing about the legality or illegality of the sex industry in the countries hosting peacekeeping operations; nor does it attempt to regulate the type and nature of establishments serving the

27 Thailand – a paradigmatic case of the link between the sex industry, sex tourism, and militarism – did not actually host a foreign military presence (i.e. U.S. troops in southeast Asia during the Vietnam war period), but was the main “rest and recreation” destination for those troops throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 28 As is the impact of the zero-tolerance policy overall; see UN (2008); Jennings (2008b).
peacekeeping economy. Nor can it: in most peacekeeping operations, the UN lacks the executive authority necessary to make and enforce such regulations, which is properly a matter for the national or sub-national authorities; and even in missions with more expansive authority, it is politically unlikely that UN policy on issues relating to the sex industry would be promulgated for a wider audience than UN personnel.

The zero-tolerance policy – and mission codes of conduct, into which it is increasingly integrated – is thus unable to deal with the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse on anything other than an individual level, with application and sanctions restricted to UN personnel. Indeed, even getting the zero-tolerance policy to apply to all categories of UN mission personnel has been a protracted affair (Jennings 2008b). This focus on the responsibilities of the individual peacekeeper is, in other words, a necessary expression of the political and legal constraints under which the UN operates. Moreover, this inability may not be driven just by the constraints the UN operates under, but also by the unwillingness on the part of the organization to see itself as part of the problem – or to acknowledge that its presence in a country is prone to the same problems as other large-scale military operations or occupations. Yet the UN’s effectiveness in acting on a key issue relating to gender and peacekeeping economies is arguably undercut by this inability to see the problem as systemic, and embedded in a particular political economy in which the organization itself is an active participant. For example, UN informants in both Liberia and Haiti frequently expressed the view that the zero-tolerance policy was virtually impossible to credibly and consistently enforce. While citing a variety of reasons for this viewpoint (lack of resources and lack of will among them), recurring factors included the sense of impunity – i.e. that “everyone does it” and few ever get caught – and other arguments suggesting the normalization of the context established by the peacekeeping economy: that transactional sex was just the way of life in this environment; that it did not do anyone any harm; that locals preferred the company of internationals to other locals; and that mission life itself was an excuse to act in ways that one

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29 Although missions can, and do, regulate the establishments that mission personnel are allowed to patronize, through the use of “off-limits” lists kept by the mission’s Department of Safety and Security. One of the considerations determining whether an establishment should be off-limits is whether prostitution is known to occur on (or be organized from) the premises. As of late 2007, both UNMIL and MINUSTAH keep off-limits lists.

30 That the UN has an institutional interest in keeping the focus on individual indiscretions – thus diverting attention from the extent to which the UN is complicit in creating an enabling environment for such abuses – is in fact a likely possibility. See Jennings (2009).
would refrain from at home. In such an environment, where activities and behavior that, in different contexts, may be considered aberrant become normalized, common, and (at least tacitly) accepted, the dependence on individuals to refrain from acting inappropriately is likely to be inadequate. The critical issue – the environment that enables the commoditization of the sexual labor of local women, men, and children – is ignored, except insofar as mission personnel are prohibited from patronizing certain establishments. The extent to which the UN itself is integral to creating and perpetuating this environment is therefore obscured.

The zero-tolerance policy towards SEA is thus predicated on the assumption – perhaps necessary, but none the less convenient – that sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers is exceptional (the acts of a few “bad apples”), and can consequently be sufficiently addressed through administrative rules and sanctions. The policy makes SEA into a technical problem of delinquent individuals. This is consistent with the larger UN habit of treating critical (and especially gendered) issues in a problem-solving manner that diverts attention away from foundational questions (Whitworth 2004: 119-127).

**Conclusion: Undermining good intentions**

Different peace operations have different mandates, goals, and objectives related to gender, although Resolution 1325 “[e]xpresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component”, and “[e]xpresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women” (UN 2000). The goal of mainstreaming gender and integrating gender perspectives within and through peacekeeping operations is a unifying principle, even if the application of that goal to specific missions may vary. Gender mainstreaming is the “process of assessing the implications for

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31 Observations based on interviews and informal discussions with UN informants in Haiti and Liberia, October and November/December 2007, respectively.
32 The zero-tolerance policy also states that “United Nations staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse”, assigning managers responsibility for ensuring that this occurs. However, there is no guidance on how to interpret or operationalize this obligation. The Zeid report (UN 2005a) suggested ways of holding managers responsible for the misconduct of their staff, but this recommendation has not been seriously or systematically implemented, with the exception of some military officers punished (by their home militaries) for the misconduct of soldiers under their command (Jennings 2008b).
women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2004: 3). This is an admirable goal, and its fulfillment has been attempted in various ways. Within missions, gender advisors and gender units have been established; these also serve as focal points in the mission’s efforts on gender aimed at the host society, in addition to intra-mission efforts to integrate a gender perspective. There are also attempts to ensure the presence of more women peacekeepers in both the military contingents and the civilian components, including at high-level command or managerial levels; the inclusion of more women is assumed to reduce demand for sexual services among peacekeepers, as well as to help change the militarized, masculinized culture of UN peacekeeping operations.33 Outward-focused efforts relating to gender depend on the mission’s mandate, but have included: support for institutional reform, including establishing a gender ministry or creating quotas for women’s representation in political parties, government, and the police and armed forces; targeting women in voter registration drives; supporting women-centric civil society groups; funding health interventions targeted to women (such as maternal and infant health programs); assisting in the drafting of laws against gender-based and domestic violence; prioritizing the inclusion of women in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform processes; and supporting programming targeted to women’s needs in development or peacebuilding interventions.

Yet there seems to be a fundamental mismatch between the organization’s goals of mainstreaming gender and promoting gender equality, and its participation in and perpetuation of a peacekeeping economy that has concrete and often negative impacts on the local women and

33 For a critical view of this assumption as relates to enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy, see Jennings (2008b: 30-31). Whitworth (2004: 185) argues that the UN approach to gender, including attempts to “gender” things like peacekeeping, conflict prevention, etc, “does not transform existing practices; it ignores the ways in which those practices are already gendered”; and contends that the practices and culture of militarized peacekeeping essentially preclude the achievement of gender equality as expressed by the notion of gender mainstreaming, thus requiring the dismantlement of the militarized model of peacekeeping for progressive changes to occur to gendered practices and relations.
men it encompasses, as well as on the gender relations being negotiated and renegotiated within the wider society. This is not to say that the UN should not attempt to further gender equality in or through peacekeeping missions, or work with and provide support to local actors on gender issues and concerns. It is nevertheless important to note that the context in which these efforts are being made matters; and, in the regressive changes that the peacekeeping economy can entail, it has the potential to undermine more positive changes being attempted in specific sectors within or outside the mission. It also opens the mission up to charges of hypocrisy, which can have a damaging and lasting impact on the mission’s effectiveness and relations with local residents and interlocutors.

The UN acknowledges that the behavior of mission personnel – as for example those committing sexually exploitative or abusive acts upon locals – can tarnish the mission’s reputation and undermine its work; this is, in fact, one of the key justifications for the zero-tolerance policy, which aims to protect not just local residents from victimization, but the UN image as well (see e.g. UN 2005a; Jennings 2008b). Yet such an acknowledgement by the UN simply replicates the organization’s tendency to compartmentalize problems associated with peacekeeping as the domain of individual actors, rather than symptoms of the larger political economy that it is unable or unwilling to deal with constructively.

This suggests that UN and other international actors need to start taking the issue of peacekeeping economies seriously. Existing UN policy that is relevant – the zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse of locals by UN personnel – may have some effect on demand for transactional sex (or simply drive more activity underground), but is unlikely to change the fundamentals of the highly gendered peacekeeping economy, which include extreme (and typically gendered) income inequality, an informal and exploitable labor force, corruption and criminality, and a lack of accountability or sustained investment on the part of individuals and institutions associated with the peacekeeping boom. The UN’s prevailing approach of ignoring the direct socioeconomic impacts of its presence – either because they are not seen, or are considered outside the mandated priorities of the mission, or are considered “normal” and temporary – is neither a sustainable nor desirable option. The failure of international actors to think critically, and act responsibly, about the highly gendered implications of their presence –
both in terms of the overall political economy but also, more directly, in terms of human lives and welfare in peacekeeping areas – implicates them in the negative effects of that presence, in the same way that they are associated with the positive outcomes of peacekeeping. While the UN may ultimately decide that it is incapable of more systematic action to reign in peacekeeping economies, the possible negative (and positive) ramifications of those economies should be addressed early, openly, and directly, and factored in to eventual decision-making on the part of both the mission and national authorities.
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